A LTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION implies that the primary responsibility in the making of foreign policy resides in the Executive Branch, the Congress shares several important powers in this area.' Among these is the prerogative to join in the making of international commitments, as expressed in the treaty-making provisions of the Constitution.2 Lately, however, critics have argued that the foreign policy powers of Congress have eroded drastically through unilateral action taken by the Executive Branch. The criticism contends, first, that the form of international commitments has changed in recent years. Increasingly, the President has used executive agreements, proclamations, or other unilateral instruments to circumvent the involvement of the Congress.3 A second and related criticism centers on the content of the various international agreements. Even when the Congress has been involved in the agreement-making process, the issues with which it has dealt have been substantively less important than those handled unilaterally by the Executive. According to this view, for example, the making of military agreements has tended to take the form of executive agreements-thus excluding congressional participation-while the making of taxation agreements or radio regulations is presented to the Congress in the forms of treaties. (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), 157-160; and Amy M. Gilbert, Executive Agreements and Treaties, 1946 -1973 (New York: Thomas-Newell, 1973 .
4 The reference is a paraphrase of Senator William Fulbright's comments in The Crippled Giant in which he contrasted the content of treaties and executive agreements for 1954 and 1968 (224 Specifically, we seek to determine the extent to which Congress and the Executive Branch have participated in the making of international agreements over the 27 year period. We explore, also, the question of whether the involvement of Congress or the Executive in agreement-making depends upon the content of the subject matter being negotiated. Are trivial matters left to the legislature while serious issues, like military policy, remain the special preserve of the Executive? Finally, we evaluate the extent to which the form and content of international agreements have differed among the five post-World War II Presidents.
THE DATA Data for this study were compiled from various source materials Senator Clifford Case is cited as having said, "We are not put in the Senate to deal only with treaties on copyrights, extradition, stamp collections and minor questions of protocol. If that is the meaning of the Constitution, then I think the Founding Fathers wasted their time." Fulbright is also quoted. "The Senate is asked to convene solemnly to approve by a two-thirds vote a treaty to preserve cultural artifacts in a friendly neighboring country. At the same time, the Chief Executive is moving American military men and material around the globe like so many pawns in a chess game." 5 See Senate Report 91-129, "National Commitments," 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1964 , April 16, 1964 . Also cited in Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, 313.
6 Classified agreements are not included in this analysis. Although the exact number of these agreements is not known for the period of our data, we do know that some 63 agreements have been sent to the Congress under an injunction of secrecy between the time that the Case Act was passed (August 1972) Each of these documents is printed by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
8 Technically, the signing of an international agreement does not always bring it into force. Instead, the signing may be only a preliminary act. For example, a treaty may be signed but never ratified; that is, it may never come *to bind the parties. However, the date of initial signing is used in this analysis, rather than the date of effectiveness, since we are interested here primarily in the initiation of international commitments by the United States-and especially the differences in initiation by the Executive and the Congress. We should emphasize again that our classifying agreements as executive applies only to those in which the President invokes his constitutionally-derived power. Those agreements that are made by the Executive pursuant to congressional legislation are classified into the statutory category. While this distinction is generally recognized by scholars in the area, the tendency has been to place executive and statutory agreements under the same "executive agreement" (non-treaty) grouping.
10 The eleven content categories follow. Examples of agreements coded in each category are presented after each entry.
(1) Military: agreements on weapons systems; bases; military assistance; military alliances; training of military personnel; military supplies (such as naval vessels); arms control.
(2) Trade and Economics: agreements on commerce; agricultural commodities; trademarks; taxes on income and property; finance and debt rescheduling; economic assistance; fishing and whaling.
(3) Transportation: agreements on airlines and shipping; prevention of incidents on and over the high seas; tolls for international waterways.
(4) Communications: postal agreements; television and radio facilities; satellite telemetry and telecommand stations.
(5) Health: sanitation agreements; disease prevention; cooperation in medical science and public health.
(6) Passports: agreements on passports and visas; immigration quotas; free-entry for diplomatic personnel.
(7) Education: agreements on educational exchanges and special educational programs.
(8) Cultural-Technical: agreements on cultural exchanges; Peace Corps; scientific and technical co-operation; copyrights; tracking stations; environmental protection; energy (including atomic); protection of migratory animals; disaster assistance; weather stations; space co-operation; remote sensing for earth surveys.
(9) Diplomatic Recognition and Relations: agreements recognizing the existence of other nations; matters relating to foreign service personnel; international boundary disputes; exchange of official government publications; transfer of territory. The over 6,000 agreements analyzed here are, of course, not of equal rank; some deal with the reduction of passport visa fees, others with major defense alliances. Comparisons based strictly on numbers have their limitations. While ultimately we hope to extend the research into qualitative comparisons, at this stage we shall focus only on the frequency of the form and content of American commitments since 1946.
FINDINGS
The results of this analysis disclose that the overwhelming percentage-almost 87 percent-of all United States agreements between 1946 and 1972 have been statutory. By contrast, executive agreements and treaties account for only 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all agreements in this same period. These aggregate figures strongly suggest that Congress has not been left out of the agreement process; indeed it has participated in the vast majority of them. At the same time, though, the data confirm the notion that the treaty has been replaced as the official instrument of foreign policy commitment." But again, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, treaties have been replaced not by executive (11) War Claims: restitution of property seized during war; matters relating to military occupation.
These eleven categories were then collapsed in the following way: (N) (1316) (1903) (821) (1135) (833) a Entries are percentages based on column N's shown at bottom. Some percentages do not add to 100 because of rounding errors.
agreements; but rather, by statutory agreements-instruments in- A similar conclusion results when we analyze the use of these different forms by administration. We fail to detect any dramatic differences among the five Presidents (Table 1) . Each (except President Truman) used the statutory agreement over 86 percent of the time for the formal conduct of American foreign policy.
Even President Truman, who relied least upon this instrument, still used it 80 percent of the time. The major differences were that President Truman was most inclined to use executive agreements and President Kennedy was least inclined. From the Truman Administration through the Nixon Administration, the use of treaties has declined. In sum, the argument that the form of international agreements has shifted to one which excludes the Congress is not supported by the evidence in this study. Moreover, when we examined the data over time and by administration, this conclusion was not altered.
The Content of International Agreements
The use of the three major forms of agreements within each of the five content or issue-areas is presented in Table 2 . Statutory agreements are once again the dominant form, regardless of the content of the international agreement. Only in the case of diplomatic content does the percentage of statutory agreements drop below 80 percent. The argument that the Congress has been systematically excluded from particular policy areas is not supported by these data. Differences across content areas do exist, however, for executive agreements and treaties. As Table 2 illustrates, executive agreements have been used most frequently for military and diplomatic policy, and considerably less often for economic, transportation/communication, and cultural/technical policies. In contrast, treaties have been used most frequently for diplomatic and transportation/communication policy, less often for economic policy, and least often for military and cultural/technical policy.
In comparing policy differences within each form, then, these 13 If we were to assume that all secret executive agreements (estimated at an additional 10 percent of the total) were military, the total percentage of military executive agreements would still not be much higher than 30 percent. Such a result would only reinforce our argument about military policy being more subject to executive discretion, but it would not alter the basic finding regarding the dominance of the statutory agreement, even in this issue-area. 
